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In 1980, 17-year-old Santae Tribble was on trial for the murder of
a 63-year-old man who was robbed and shot on the front porch
of his Washington, D.C., home. There was little evidence in the
case, aside from the testimony of a police informant, who said
Tribble had admitted to his involvement. Tribble had a strong
alibi too, with a number of witnesses all testifying that he was
away at his mother’s in Maryland at the time of the murder. The
federal prosecutors, however, had one more piece of evidence. At
Tribble’s trial, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) analyst
presented a microscopic examination of hairs from the stocking
mask the killer had worn and discarded near the crime scene.
The FBI analyst explained that “[o]nly on very rare occasions”
had he ever seen hairs of two individuals with the same characteristic. More pointed, he found the hairs with those of Tribble
and concluded that “I found that these hairs . . . matched in all
microscopic characteristics with the head hair samples submitted to me from Santae Tribble.” In his closing arguments, the
prosecutor went further: “There is one chance, perhaps for all we
know, in 10 million that it could [be] someone else’s hair.” Tribble
was sentenced to 20 years to life, and served a 23-year sentence.
In fact, none of the 13 hairs belonged to Tribble. Nine years
after Tribble’s parole in 2003, DNA tests exonerated him. The
hairs were not his, but came from three other individuals—and
a dog. The “science” behind the FBI’s testimony was so weak,

it couldn’t even distinguish human hair from animal hair. The
FBI response to this case and the cases of two other men would
eventually lead to one of the largest crime lab audits in history.

Systemic Problems
The problem of unsound forensic evidence is not limited to hair
analysis. In 2009, a National Academy of Sciences committee
tasked by Congress with studying the needs of the forensic science community found not only was there “no scientific support”
for the use of hair evidence to identify defendants, but also that
the problem is much broader. No forensic discipline, apart from
DNA testing, “has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to
consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a
connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.”
Despite the fact that most forensic evidence is far from conclusive, hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals have been
convicted and deprived of their liberty based on assertions by
government agents that the evidence is reliable science. I have
read trial transcripts of DNA exonerees by the hundreds, and
they are chilling. I have found that more often than not, the testimony was exaggerated, overstated, and erroneous. My book,
Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong,
told the story of the first 250 DNA exonerations in the United
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States. Based on updated data and a detailed review of the cases,
we learn that more than half of the exonerations involved convictions based on invalid, erroneous, or concealed forensics. Most
egregiously, 28 cases involved concealed exculpatory forensics
that could have supported a claim of innocence at trial if it had
been disclosed. An additional 29 cases involved analysis that
was erroneous, including lab errors.
These systemic problems have increasingly confronted lawyers, judges, and policymakers with the question: What should
be done when an entire forensic crime laboratory breaks down?
Forensic science evidence—from DNA to fingerprints, ballistics, pathology, and chemical assays—is used in hundreds of
thousands of criminal investigations each year. There are over
400 public crime labs in the United States, as well as private
labs. Without forensics, serious crimes would go unsolved. With
modern forensics, innocent people have had their names cleared.
And yet, with alarming frequency, groups of forensic analysts or
even entire crime labs have had their work come under scrutiny
due to flawed or even fraudulent work. The response has sometimes been that this was due to the work of a “bad apple,” and
sometimes people did commit terrible mistakes or they falsified evidence. But the reason so many entire crime labs around
the country have been audited or even shut down is that sound
systems were not in place to prevent forensic errors and even
fraud. Despite lessons learned from countless wrongful convictions and lab scandals, those systems still require an overhaul.
The systemic nature of the problem can be appreciated by
considering the facts about how this work is done and how law
enforcement, prosecutors, and crime labs close ranks when
problems emerge. Forensic analysts used by prosecutors typically work in groups at law enforcement crime labs or within
police departments with common supervision and training. For
instance, from 1985, when the FBI began tracking cases using a
computer system, to 1999, FBI agents analyzed and testified in
over 3,000 cases using hair comparisons. The FBI also “trained”
untold numbers of state and local hair analysts for 25 years.
And yet, despite the high stakes and reason to believe the
problem is widespread, government officials have generally resisted large-scale audits of forensic evidence used in criminal
trials. Take the case of Jimmy Ray Bromgard, exonerated by
DNA testing after serving 15 years in prison in Montana. At his
trial, the then director of the Montana State Crime Laboratory
compared more than 30 hairs and found that they all “matched”
Bromgard’s hairs. He announced his conclusion in court with
seemingly powerful but made-up statistics that had no scientific
basis. He did the same in other cases. Two more men, Chester
Bauer and Paul Kordonowy, were wrongly convicted based on
his testimony, only to be exonerated by DNA after years spent in
prison. To this day, there has been no examination of the other
cases that lab director worked on or supervised in the lab. When
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In Bad Hair: The Legal Response to Mass Forensic Errors,
Professor Brandon Garrett begins by describing the infamous
Santae Tribble case. Fortunately, we have learned a lot since his
conviction in 1980, and not just in microscopic hair analysis. It is
clear that many forensic witnesses in years past overstated their
conclusions and that prosecutors also overstated the experts’
conclusions in their jury arguments. But one caveat is that, in
many instances, that was the “science” as it was known at the
time. We have learned much since the advent of DNA analysis
about where the system went wrong. In most cases, it is unfair
to overgeneralize past forensic science testimony as widespread
fraudulent forensic science.
Of course, while some conclusions were overstated, not every defendant was factually innocent. Often other evidence
pointed toward guilt. That said, even the overstated conclusions
likely would warrant a new trial or, at a minimum, an evidentiary hearing. There is no excuse for withholding evidence or
laboratory procedures, especially if the undisclosed evidence
or procedure might lead to the exclusion or exoneration of a
suspect. Transparency and disclosure of any and all relevant
information to the defense and the courts is essential. While
Professor Garrett is critical of government agents, including forensic scientists, it also should be noted that defense attorneys,
trial judges, and appellate courts at the time often didn’t challenge or critically review forensic evidence and the conclusions
flowing from it.
Errors and omissions of the type that occurred in the Tribble
case often still happen today. But one very positive step to correct
that has been the increasing effort to provide forensic science
education for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges in the
(Continued on page 35)
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Bromgard’s lawyers requested an audit, the Montana Supreme
Court refused to order one. The Montana attorney general also
refused to investigate the lab, saying it would be an “expensive,
tedious process.”
Problems with this kind of testimony had been known for
years, but FBI agents continued to testify in court with an air
of certainty about the science of hair analysis. In the mid-1990s,
the inspector general created a task force that reviewed FBI
hair comparison work “after reports that sloppy work by examiners at the FBI lab was producing unreliable forensic evidence in court trials.” Spencer S. Hsu, Convicted Defendants Left
Uninformed of Forensic Flaws Found by Justice Dept., Wash. Post,
Apr. 16, 2012, www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/convicteddefendants-left-uninformed-of-forensic-flaws-found-by-justicedept/2012/04/16/gIQAWTcgMT_story.html. The findings were
never released. Only the prosecutors in affected cases were notified—not the defense or the people convicted based on the flawed
testimony, like Santae Tribble, who was still in prison at the time.
The cases even included death penalty cases. The inspector general who conducted the investigation, Michael Bromwich, was
deeply troubled that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and FBI
task force “apparently failed to follow through and ensure that
defense counsel were notified in every single case.”
It is important to note this was not the first time the FBI’s
crime lab had to reckon with claims of junk science. The
FBI stopped using “bullet-lead” comparisons in response to

devastating criticism from the scientific community. Similarly,
the FBI conducted an inquiry and improved procedures in response to a high-profile error in a fingerprint case, in which
agents falsely implicated an Oregon lawyer as a terrorist associated with the Madrid train bombings in 2004.

Problems Finally Come to Light
The lid began to come off due to the tireless work of lawyers at
the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia. They
helped free a man named Donald Eugene Gates, who was convicted of murder in Washington, D.C., and spent 28 years in prison. He had been convicted based in part on erroneous hair comparison testimony by an FBI agent. In 2009, he was exonerated
by DNA tests that proved his innocence. Gates was not the only
one. Lawyers at the D.C. Public Defender Service also helped free
Kirk Odom, who served 22 years in prison, and Santae Tribble.
In both cases, FBI agents testified that hair analysis linked the
men to the crimes. They were wrong.
Initially, the response of the U.S. Attorney and the FBI was
to treat this as an isolated bad-apple problem. After the Gates
exoneration, when the judge was considering an inquiry into
additional cases, the U.S. Attorney’s Office told the court that
there was “no legal and scientific basis for conducting such a
‘massive’ audit.” Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Chief
Judge Lee F. Satterfield, (Nov. 15, 2010) (on file with author).
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Fortunately, the lawyers at the Public Defender Service did not
give up. After the two additional DNA exonerations, which the
Washington Post described in 2012, the U.S. Attorney and the
FBI agreed to try to review not just the work of the examiners in
those particular cases but also the work of all convictions based
on hair analysis. If errors were identified, the DOJ notified the
defense attorney at trial, the defendant, and the prosecutor. The
government also agreed to provide free DNA testing and waive
any procedural barriers to re-litigating these cases in post-conviction proceedings. These steps set an important template for
future administrative schemes for the review of forensic errors,
whether ordered by a court or an executive agency.
In March 2015, after the FBI analyzed 500 cases, it announced
that “at least 90 percent” of trial transcripts contained erroneous
statements. The FBI noted that defendants in at least 35 of the
cases had received the death penalty, and errors were identified
in 33 of those cases. Nine had already been executed and five
died of other causes on death row. The FBI also announced that
26 of 28 agents either gave testimony or submitted lab reports
with erroneous statements.
In response to the FBI and DOJ audit, Massachusetts, New
York, North Carolina, and Texas are beginning to review cases
that involved hair analysis. Many more states need to do the
same. In Texas, the Forensic Science Commission is also reviewing old cases involving bite mark testimony and statistics used
in thousands of old DNA cases. In Massachusetts, courts have
ordered a sustained inquiry into the casework of a crime lab
chemist who falsified results and engaged in “dry labbing,” or
failure to even do the tests. That analyst worked on an estimated
40,000 cases. An internal report noted that the high number of
the chemist’s cases alone was troublesome. In response to “egregious misconduct” and “a lapse of widespread magnitude in the
criminal justice system,” the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court has set up procedures to notify defendants and conduct
hearings in those cases. The chief justice of the Superior Court
ordered judges to hold special “drug lab sessions”—hundreds of
hearings examining cases potentially affected by the misconduct.
Fortunately, the FBI has also expanded its review beyond cases in which trial testimony was given to cases in which there was
a guilty plea. Procedures like those adopted in Massachusetts
may need to be used by judges to reopen any potentially affected cases.
Not only can lawyers do important work in individual cases
by challenging unscientific forensics; they can take on a more
systemic role, as the Public Defender Services did in the FBI
audit, by asking that judges, prosecutors, and crime labs consider reopening old cases. The FBI audit began with a request
by a judge to review certain old cases, but eventually lawyers
convinced law enforcement to pursue a far broader inquiry.
Courts and agencies that have addressed these issues have

S U A

S P O N T E

A Jud ge Com ment s
(Continued from page 33)
various forensic science disciplines, as well as explaining the
role human factors play in forensic analysis. The Texas Forensic
Science Commission and the Arizona Forensic Science Academy,
among others, have provided a model for such training. Also,
the National Commission on Forensic Science’s subcommittee
on training and education has made great efforts to provide an
education template for the improvement of the forensic sciences.
Laboratories and forensic scientists are now advocating for
and developing improved, consensual standards, guidelines,
and forensic practitioner ethics codes. To its credit, the FBI has
conducted inquiries in the area of microscopic hair analysis,
lead bullet analysis, latent print comparisons, and DNA mixture
interpretation—some in conjunction with other stakeholders
such as the Innocence Network and the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. As Professor Garrett writes, the
FBI’s response and cooperation in the microscopic hair analysis
reexamination project provides a road map for future collaborative reviews.
The 2009 National Academy of Sciences report led to formation of the National Commission on Forensic Science (by
the Department of Justice) and the Organization of Scientific
Area Committees (by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology), both of which seek to improve the field of forensic
science as well as the intersection of science and law because of
the deficiencies found in various reviews. Those reexaminations
should not necessarily be limited to cases that went to trial; they
should also include those resolved through plea bargains, given
the many DNA exonerations of people who pleaded guilty. The
form of these reviews should be based on recommendations
from multi-stakeholder bodies like the National Commission
on Forensic Science. Professor Garrett’s recommendations as to
notice, bar participation, post-conviction time bar waivers, and
model statutes or regulations are important steps in a collaboration to help ensure justice is served.
Progress to right the wrongs of the criminal justice system
has been slow, but it is beginning to speed up, with forensic
scientists now getting together to improve their disciplines.
Statistical evaluation of forensic methods and technical concepts
are being used to better understand how past errors occurred.
Fundamental research has identified human factor strategies
for maximizing reliability in real-life forensic investigations.
Based on our experience, we want to strongly commend forensic
scientists for their demonstrated commitment to improve reliability in their field and thereby improve the delivery of justice. q
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had to design corrective mechanisms themselves. We need clear
rules and uniform approaches. Agencies, courts, legislatures,
and bar associations should draft model regulations and statutes
reflecting procedures to be followed when patterns of forensic
errors come to light. Routine audit procedures should be established. What ground rules should apply?

Suggested Ground Rules
statutory triggers. First, there should be statutory mechanisms
to order audits of tainted crime lab evidence. Most cases result
in plea bargains, and the typical public defender does not have
the time or resources to consider these issues in individual cases.
Because the problem is a systemic one that affects all cases, the
response should be an administrative one. Of course, individual
lawyers must be aware of these concerns and use this knowledge
when possible to defend the wrongly accused and to bring reliance on deficient scientific evidence to public light.

The “science” behind
the FBI’s testimony
was so weak, it couldn’t
even distinguish human
hair from animal hair.
notice. Any audit must come with due process rights to ensure that the lawyers and clients actually learn that the forensics were botched in their cases. It is not enough to simply send
letters to last known addresses of lawyers who handled cases
decades before. Many will have retired. Vigorous affirmative efforts should be made to locate lawyers and their clients. Effective
process will also require notifying institutional public defenders
and involving state and local bar associations in taking on the
task of handling cases.
Bar participation. The FBI did something very important in
its audit: It partnered with the bar to identify and secure appropriate relief in affected cases. Lawyers with the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and the
Innocence Project, together with pro bono lawyers at Winston
& Strawn LLP and Michael Bromwich of the Bromwich Group,
collaborated with the FBI in its self-examination. The FBI
sent letters not just to defense counsel, the client, and the

prosecutor, but also to the NACDL and Innocence Project.
This collaborative approach provides an essential template
for future audits.
Discovery. Notice should include more than just the information that one’s case is part of an audit. It should include meaningful discovery. Once lawyers know that there was a problem
with the forensic evidence in the case, there should be assistance
in locating records from the trial, including transcripts that
record what the analysts said at trial. Complete lab notes and
bench notes that show what the analyst claimed to have done
in the laboratory should be preserved and located. Procedures
in place at the lab at the time should be disclosed.
Follow-on testing. Available samples should undergo DNA
testing, as the FBI did on its hair sample evidence.
Hearings. The court or administrative body should conduct hearings in which the burden is on the state to show that
a case was not affected by the pattern of tainted forensic evidence. Courts have handled systemic forensic errors using such
a burden-shifting scheme in West Virginia and more recently in
Massachusetts. Appointing special masters or convening special sessions in the trial courts, as in Massachusetts, may help
to expedite judicial review.
relief. One obstacle to relief may be post-conviction bars
to filing successive or otherwise time-barred petitions. Any
potentially applicable procedural bars should be waived, given
that, at the time of trial, the defense could not have known that
the seemingly confident lab analyst was working in, or even responsible for, a tainted system. Plea bargains also raise special
challenges. In Massachusetts, more severe charges and sentences are barred when guilty pleas are reopened. This approach
should be replicated.
The daughter of the victim of the murder for which Tribble
was wrongly imprisoned wrote: “I lost a father many years ago to
murder. Now I learn that the wrong man spent years in prison for
the crime. . . . I will do anything to help to see that justice is done.”
Lawyers must take up this challenge in specific cases and in
general. Judges need to be far more attentive to these problems
when they arise at trial, on appeal, and in post-conviction hearings. Otherwise, they are likely to face audits of thousands of
cases down the road. Clearer scientific standards for forensics will
help, and a DOJ-established Commission on Forensic Science has
taken on that project. Working groups supported by the National
Institute on Standards and Technology are also looking into these
questions. The legal profession as well as scientists will play a
central role in years ahead to demand audits and see that they are
conducted carefully. Model rules for reviewing flawed forensics
and reopening affected cases, with the full involvement of the bar,
should be in place to ensure that justice is done. q

Published in Litigation, Volume 42, Number 4, Summer 2016. © 2016 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not
be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

36

had to design corrective mechanisms themselves. We need clear
rules and uniform approaches. Agencies, courts, legislatures,
and bar associations should draft model regulations and statutes
reflecting procedures to be followed when patterns of forensic
errors come to light. Routine audit procedures should be established. What ground rules should apply?

Suggested Ground Rules
statutory triggers. First, there should be statutory mechanisms
to order audits of tainted crime lab evidence. Most cases result
in plea bargains, and the typical public defender does not have
the time or resources to consider these issues in individual cases.
Because the problem is a systemic one that affects all cases, the
response should be an administrative one. Of course, individual
lawyers must be aware of these concerns and use this knowledge
when possible to defend the wrongly accused and to bring reliance on deficient scientific evidence to public light.

The “science” behind
the FBI’s testimony
was so weak, it couldn’t
even distinguish human
hair from animal hair.
notice. Any audit must come with due process rights to ensure that the lawyers and clients actually learn that the forensics were botched in their cases. It is not enough to simply send
letters to last known addresses of lawyers who handled cases
decades before. Many will have retired. Vigorous affirmative efforts should be made to locate lawyers and their clients. Effective
process will also require notifying institutional public defenders
and involving state and local bar associations in taking on the
task of handling cases.
Bar participation. The FBI did something very important in
its audit: It partnered with the bar to identify and secure appropriate relief in affected cases. Lawyers with the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and the
Innocence Project, together with pro bono lawyers at Winston
& Strawn LLP and Michael Bromwich of the Bromwich Group,
collaborated with the FBI in its self-examination. The FBI
sent letters not just to defense counsel, the client, and the

prosecutor, but also to the NACDL and Innocence Project.
This collaborative approach provides an essential template
for future audits.
Discovery. Notice should include more than just the information that one’s case is part of an audit. It should include meaningful discovery. Once lawyers know that there was a problem
with the forensic evidence in the case, there should be assistance
in locating records from the trial, including transcripts that
record what the analysts said at trial. Complete lab notes and
bench notes that show what the analyst claimed to have done
in the laboratory should be preserved and located. Procedures
in place at the lab at the time should be disclosed.
Follow-on testing. Available samples should undergo DNA
testing, as the FBI did on its hair sample evidence.
Hearings. The court or administrative body should conduct hearings in which the burden is on the state to show that
a case was not affected by the pattern of tainted forensic evidence. Courts have handled systemic forensic errors using such
a burden-shifting scheme in West Virginia and more recently in
Massachusetts. Appointing special masters or convening special sessions in the trial courts, as in Massachusetts, may help
to expedite judicial review.
relief. One obstacle to relief may be post-conviction bars
to filing successive or otherwise time-barred petitions. Any
potentially applicable procedural bars should be waived, given
that, at the time of trial, the defense could not have known that
the seemingly confident lab analyst was working in, or even responsible for, a tainted system. Plea bargains also raise special
challenges. In Massachusetts, more severe charges and sentences are barred when guilty pleas are reopened. This approach
should be replicated.
The daughter of the victim of the murder for which Tribble
was wrongly imprisoned wrote: “I lost a father many years ago to
murder. Now I learn that the wrong man spent years in prison for
the crime. . . . I will do anything to help to see that justice is done.”
Lawyers must take up this challenge in specific cases and in
general. Judges need to be far more attentive to these problems
when they arise at trial, on appeal, and in post-conviction hearings. Otherwise, they are likely to face audits of thousands of
cases down the road. Clearer scientific standards for forensics will
help, and a DOJ-established Commission on Forensic Science has
taken on that project. Working groups supported by the National
Institute on Standards and Technology are also looking into these
questions. The legal profession as well as scientists will play a
central role in years ahead to demand audits and see that they are
conducted carefully. Model rules for reviewing flawed forensics
and reopening affected cases, with the full involvement of the bar,
should be in place to ensure that justice is done. q

Published in Litigation, Volume 42, Number 4, Summer 2016. © 2016 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not
be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

36

